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This paper reviews both theoretical and empirical studies of ﬁnancial transmission
rights (FTRs) in the major U.S. wholesale power markets and provides a simple il-
lustrative two-stage model to study the competitive behaviors of electricity generators
(wholesale power sellers) and load serving entities (LSEs)(wholesale power buyers) and
the welfare eﬀects of FTRs in the restructuring U.S. wholesale power market frame-
work. The analysis focuses on a competitive two-node electricity network model where
there is one generator and one LSE in each node with linear marginal cost and demand
function, supervised by an independent system operator (ISO). In the ﬁrst-stage of
modeling, a no-rights benchmark model is developed to solve for the optimal quantity
of power production and consumption and derive the locational marginal price for each
node, which serve as the building blocks to solve for the optimal FTR hedge positions
in the second-stage model. Once a stochastic shock is introduced, the second-stage
model shows that the acquisition of optimal FTRs by the risk averse generators and
LSEs will increase and in general will strictly increase the social welfare compared with
the case where there is no FTRs available. This result presents a counterexample to
the somewhat negative views about FTRs held by other economists in the literature
and provides some economic explanations to the fact that FTRs are widely adopted as
a ﬁnancial hedge instrument in the major U.S. wholesale power markets.
Keywords: ﬁnancial transmission rights, locational marginal price, security-constrained
economic dispatch, independent system operator, congestion rent
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As the largest regulated energy industry in the United States, the U.S. electric power industry
has undergone a tremendous change to become more competitive (U.S. Department of Energy
2000). One of the central components in the competitive electricity market is to have open
access to the transmission system. In the U.S., the major transmission system can be roughly
divided into three regions, the East and West Interconnections and the Electricity Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Three major U.S. interconnected transmission systems
Electricity as an economic good has its unique features. The most distinct one is that its
storage cost is enormously high such that almost all the electric power is delivered through
transmission lines for immediate consumption once it is produced. As indicated in a recent
National Transmission Grid Study (2002), there is now a tendency for U.S. transmission
lines to get congested and thus create substantial impact on the locational pricing system
and overall reliability of U.S. wholesale power market (see Stoft 2002 and Wilson 2002). The
U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) responds to this issue by calling a new
independent institutional entity to manage and handle transmission assets, i.e., Independent
System Operator (ISO). By the nature of ISO, it is a non-proﬁt organization whose purpose
is to monitor the power ﬂow, collect generator’s supply oﬀers and load serving entity (LSE)’s
demand bids, and calculate the optimal power dispatch taking into account various network
2constraints such as energy balancing constraint and thermal limit constraint.
To address the above congestion issue, it is a common practice in the U.S. wholesale
power market for ISO to issue ﬁnancial transmission rights (FTRs). According to ISO
New England Manual (2003a), an FTR is a ﬁnancial instrument that entitles the holder to
receive compensation for transmission congestion costs that arise when the transmission grid
is congested in the day-ahead market. The amount of compensation is based on diﬀerences
in day-ahead locational marginal prices (LMPs) result from the dispatch of generators to
relieve the congestion. FTR entitles its holders to a share of the congestion rents collected
in the day-ahead energy market, thus provides the holder a ﬁnancial hedge in the day-ahead
market for the nodal price diﬀerence between a node of receipt (source) to a node of delivery
(sink).
In the literature four types of FTRs have been proposed 1, namely, point-to-point(PTP)
obligation, PTP option, ﬂowgate (FG) obligation, and FG option (see Hogan 2002 and
2003). An FTR option entitles its holders to revenue when day-ahead congestion occurs in
the desired direction. In contrast,an FTR obligation entitles it holders to a revenue when
day-ahead congestion occurs in the desired direction and obligates holders to a payment
when day-ahead congestion is in the opposite direction. When using PTP FTRs, market
participants can obtain any collection of FTRs corresponding to a feasible power ﬂow in the
transmission system. When using FG FTRs, market participants can only obtain FTRs on
pre-determined transmission lines (ﬂowgates), which are considered most at risk should the
lines get congested.
The deﬁnition of a PTP FTR obligation can be more clearly illustrated in the following
example. Suppose there are two nodes in the transmission network, node A where power
is injected into the transmission network and node B where power is withdrawn from the
transmission network. Assuming no transmission losses, the PTP FTR entitles the holder
to the diﬀerence in day-ahead LMP between node A and B. By its obligation nature, the
FTR holder receives a positive payment (LMP(B)-LMP(A)) from the ISO if LMP(B) exceeds
LMP(A). On the other hand, the FTR holder is obligated to pay the ISO (LMP(A)-LMP(B))
if LMP(A) exceeds LMP(B). Thus the wholesale power market participants’s risks associated
with diﬀerent LMPs are in principle decreased by purchasing FTRs.
To date, FTRs have been widely used to hedge against the potential loss in the transmis-
sion congestion in major U.S. wholesale power markets. For example, FTR was introduced
in the PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland) Interconnection since April 1998, in
1As recommended in WPMP by FERC (2003), the U.S. electricity industry have favored PTP FTRs due
to its simplicity to implement and its successes in the early restructuring markets such as PJM and New
York.
3New York since September 1999, in California since February 2000, and in New England
since March 2003. Note that FTRs have been known under diﬀerent names in diﬀerent U.S.
power markets. For instance, in PJM FTRs are referred to as Fixed Transmission Rights,
in New York Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs), in California Firm Transmission
Rights, in New England Financial Transmission Rights, and in Texas Transmission Conges-
tion Rights (TCRs).
In spite of the fact that FTR has been widely used in the major U.S. electricity market,
it is still a new market instrument that needs theoretical and empirical evaluations. There
are issues remaining questionable such as to what extent, if there is any, can FTRs help
facilitate the market to generate orderly, fair, and eﬃcient outcomes despite attempts by
market participants to gain individual advantage through strategic behavior? In addition,
does the introduction of FTRs create an appropriate incentive for individual ﬁrms to invest
in the transmission infrastructure?
Although many theoretical models have been proposed and empirical evidences have been
discussed in the literature, no attempt has been made to summarize the previous ﬁndings
about FTRs. The contribution of this paper is to ﬁrst provide a comprehensive review of
various FTR ﬁndings from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, and then to better
illustrate economic eﬃciency improvement of introducing FTR in the presence of uncertainty,
a simple economic network model is presented and results are discussed. Therefore, this paper
is organized as follows. The second section conducts a literature review on both theoretical
and empirical studies of FTRs in the U.S. wholesale power market. Section three presents
the no-rights benchmark model, which is essentially the competitive equilibrium framework
applied to the economic dispatch model in a simple 2-node electricity network. Section four
then uses the economic dispatch solution from the benchmark model as the building block to
construct a 2-node FTR model where uncertainty is introduced as stochastic shocks to both
demand and supply sides. Section ﬁve discusses the conclusions and potential extensions of
future work.
2 FTRs in Theory and Practice
2.1 Theoretical Studies of FTRs
FTRs and market power
Although FTR advocates argue that tradable FTRs should facilitate electricity trade in
4the short run through the alleviation of transmission bottlenecks caused by congestion (see
Hogan(2003)), in the current economic literature, people hold more negative views toward
FTRs.
For example, in a well-known study, Joskow and Tirole (2000) reach a negative conclusion
about FTRs. In their two-node network model with cheap cost generators in the north node,
expensive cost generators in the south node, and a transmission line linking the North and
the South that has a ﬁxed thermal capacity, they argue that the acquisition of ﬁnancial rights
may enhance the market power in the South if the generators in the South are owned by a
monopoly ﬁrm. In addition, they carry out a welfare comparison and show that the social
welfare derived from the absence of transmission rights is at least as high as and in general
higher than the social welfare derived from the system with the ﬁnancial transmission rights.
This striking result clearly indicates the negative views about FTRs held by the authors.
Responding to Joskow and Tirole’s result, Hogan (2000) provides an example which shows
that introducing ﬁnancial rights enhances monopoly proﬁts but it increases eﬃciency as well.
This is in contrast to Joskow and Tirole’s result which implies that the no-rights solution
is always the most eﬃcient one. The case in Hogan’s comment diﬀered from Joskow and
Tirole in that the monopolist controls generation at more than one location and some of
its generation is at low cost. The detailed derivation is in Cardel, Hitt and Hogan (1997).
This example shows the complex nature of the deregulated U.S. electricity market structure
such as having signiﬁcant diﬀerent results and policy implications due to diﬀerent network
conﬁgurations.
By using a Cournot model of competition in a congested transmission network, Oren
(1997) illustrates that even in the absence of market concentration, the expectation of con-
gestion and passive transmission rights can lead to implicit collusion among generators and
departure from marginal cost pricing. This invalidates the key premise underlying the in-
direct implementation of transmission rights trading through optimal dispatch by the ISO.
The author concludes that passive transmission rights (in the form of transmission congestion
contracts (TCCs)) will be preempted by the active traders who will adjust their prices so as
to capture the congestion rents. Price distortions due to congestion and passive transmission
ownership can result in short and long term ineﬃciency.
By re-investigating the issues in Oren (1997), Stoft (1999) demonstrates that ﬁnancial
transmission rights such as TCCs allow their owners to capture at least a portion, and
sometimes all, of the congestion rents, and thus is shown to be eﬀective in reducing market
power. Moreover, the extent to which TCCs can reduce the market power depends on the
extent to which total generation capacity exceeds the capacity of the largest generator. This
5result is in contrast with Oren’s. The author states the reasons why his conclusions diﬀer
from Oren’s in two perspectives. First, he points out that in Oren’s second example, which
is intended to be a Cournot model, is mistakenly constructed as a Bertrand model and
then mis-analyzed. When the model is re-built along Cournot lines, Oren’s conclusion is
refuted. Second, in Oren’s model, it is assumed that generators could not purchase ﬁnancial
transmission rights while in Stoft’s model, this assumption is relaxed.
In another paper, Bushnell (1999) expresses his concern that transmission rights can be
manipulated by its owners to reduce transmission capacity made available to the competitive
market during hours in which there would otherwise be no congestion. In the short run, such
withholding behavior could prove proﬁtable for ﬁrms in several ways such as increasing the
value of local generators and the value of the transmission rights themselves. The author
illustrates his point by using a simple two-node network case with one ﬁxed marginal cost
generator at one node and a downward-sloping demand at the other node. Lastly the author
argues that due to the concerns about transmission capacity withholding and the inherent
network uncertainties, the initial oﬀering of transmission rights in California was to be limited
to a level below the full transmission capacity available to the California ISO.
Using human-subject experiment, Kench (2004) conducts an interesting study to test the
theoretical results in Joskow and Tirole (2000). Speciﬁcally, the author carries out a double-
oral auction (DOA) experiment to test the predictions of Joskow and Tirole’s theoretical
results for a radial electricity market without transmission rights, with ﬁnancial transmis-
sion rights, and with physical rights. The author found that physical rights lead to more
”right” market signals, decrease some market power, and remove an uncertainty about elec-
tricity transmission congestion better than ﬁnancial rights or the absence of rights. However,
the author also pointed out that one should be very cautious in trying to interpret his exper-
imental results into policy implications because the stylized market setting in his paper does
not capture many intricacies (such as the ”loop ﬂow eﬀect”) of real world electricity markets.
FTRs and auction design issue
Bautista and Quintana (2005) develop a methodology to screen and discriminate FTRs
that may exacerbate the market power for some monopoly market participants. The pro-
posed methodology is based upon the use of relative hedging position ratios. These ratios
comprise the network conﬁguration, market outcomes, and the participants position in the
market, and quantify the relationship between the positions of an FTR bidder in the energy
market and in the transmission rights allocation. The authors also point out that since an
6FTR scheme has a reduced liquidity, which may be worsened if a discrimination such as in
this study is introduced. Due to the potential complexity for carrying out any regulatory
intervention on FTRs ownership, the authors suggest to build the FTRs framework upon
their allocation to other entities, such as LSEs or traders, rather than generators.
Mendez and Rudnick (2004) propose a new congestion management system under nodal
and zonal dispatches with implementation of ﬁxed transmission rights (FTR) and ﬂowgate
rights (FGR), respectively. Using a static simulation model, which implements marginal
theory where congestion components are introduced in the pricing model, they show that
the FTR model is suitable for congestion management in deregulated centralized market
structures with nodal dispatch, while the FGR is suitable for decentralized markets. Their
application indicates that FGR presents advantages over FTR regarding signals on grid use,
but its application is too complicated to make its implementation attractive.
In a related study trying to accommodate both point-to-point and ﬂowgate transmission
rights, O’Neill et al (2002) propose a ”joint energy and transmission rights auction” (JE-
TRA) to allow transmission users to specify which type of transmission rights, point-to-point
or ﬂowgate, they prefer to use and reconﬁgure them over time. JETRA is able to simultane-
ously accommodate ﬂowgate and point-to-point options and obligations, along with energy
production and consumption futures. Under certain conditions, the authors prove that the
auction is revenue adequate for the market operator in the sense that payments to rights
holders cannot exceed congestion revenues.
FTRs and transmission investment/expansion
In another set of papers several authors address the issues of transmission investment or
expansion in the hope to ﬁnd the best way to attract investment for the long-term expansion
of an electricity transmission network.
Joskow and Tirole (2003) examine the performance of a ”merchant transmission” model
in which investment in electric transmission capacity rely upon competition and free entry to
exploit proﬁtable transmission investment opportunities rather than on regulated monopoly
transmission companies. Under strict assumptions, the authors show that the merchant
investment model is able to solve the natural monopoly problem traditionally associated
with electricity transmission networks. However, when the authors extend their model by
introducing assumptions that more accurately reﬂect the physical and economic attributes
of transmission networks, many attractive properties of the merchant model disappear and
ineﬃcient transmission investment decisions are made.
7In a related study, Kristiansen and Rosellon (2004) propose a merchant mechanism to
expand electricity transmission based on long-term FTRs. As the authors argue, the system
operator needs a protocol for awarding incremental FTRs that maximize investor’s prefer-
ences, and preserves certain unallocated FTRs (or proxy awards) so as to maintain revenue
adequacy. They deﬁne a proxy award as the best use of the current network along the same
direction as the incremental awards, and develop a bi-level computational model for allocat-
ing long-term FTRs according to this rule and apply it to diﬀerent network topologies. They
ﬁnd that simultaneous feasibility for a transmission expansion project crucially depends on
the investor-preference and the proxy-preference parameters.
In another interesting study, Rudkevich (2004) investigates the investment and bidding
strategies for ﬁrm transmission rights. The study ﬁrst addresses the applicability of the
Markowitz portfolio theory to investing in ﬁrm transmission rights (FTRs) or transmission
congestion contracts (TCCs) typical for Northeastern U.S. electricity market. Speciﬁcally,
the author uses the principal component analysis to select subsets of statistically independent
FTRs/TCCs and obtain the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for arbitrage opportunities.
In the second part of paper, the author analyzes the proﬁt-maximizing bidding strategies for
large players with signiﬁcant Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs).
In a survey study on the topic of transmission expansion, Rosellon (2003) studies the
three existing approaches to electricity transmission expansion, i.e., transmission expansion
through long-term FTRs, through regulatory mechanisms and through strategic behavior of
generators (market power). The ﬁrst approach relies on the auction of long-term FTRs by an
independent system operator (also known as the merchant approach). The second approach
is to provide a Transco with the incentive to expand transmission by making it confront
the social cost of transmission congestion. The last approach deﬁnes optimal expansion of
the transmission network according to the strategic behavior of generators. After comparing
each approach’s advantage and disadvantage, the author concludes that there is no single
mechanism that guarantees the optimal expansion of the electricity transmission network,
and suggest that there may exists the second-best approach which is to combine the merchant
and the regulated transmission model.
The vast literature of theoretical FTRs studies is be summarized in Table 1.
2.2 Empirical Studies of FTRs
Siddiqui et al. (2003) analyze the public data from 2000 and 2001, and ﬁnd out that New
York transmission congestion contracts (TCCs) provides market participants with a poten-
tially eﬀective hedge against volatile congestion rents. However, the prices paid for TCCs
8Table 1: Overview of Theoretical Studies in FTRs
FTRs and Market Power FTR Auction Design Transmission Investment
Joskow and Tirole (2000) Bautista and Quintana (2005) Joskow and Tirole (2003)
Hogan (2000) Mendez and Rudnick (2004) Kristiansen and Rosellon (2004)
Oren (1997) O’Neill et al (2002) Rudkevich (2004)
Stoft (1999) Rosellon (2003)
Bushnell (1999)
Kench (2004)
systematically diviated from the associated congestion rents for distant locations and at high
prices. Based on their analyses, the authors suggest that there exist an inﬃcient market for
TCCs due to the fact that the price paid for the hedge not being in line with the congestion
rents, i.e., unreasonably high risk premiums are being paid. The authors then oﬀer two
possible explanations to their empirical ﬁnding. One is the low liquidity of TCC markets
and the other is the deviation of TCC feasibility requirements from actual energy ﬂows.
In response to Siddiqui et al. (2003) regarding the ineﬃcient pricing of TCCs in New
York market, Deng et al. (2004) try to investigate further on the question that whether
the price deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to
inherent ineﬃciencies in the auction structure. They show that even with perfect foresight
of average congestion rents the clearing prices for the FTRs depends on the bid quantity
and therefore may not be priced correctly in the FTR auction. The authors conclude that
price discovery alone would not remedy the discrepancy between the auction prices and the
realized values of the FTRs, and secondary markets or frequent reconﬁguration auctions are
necessary in order to achieve such convergence.
In a practical study, Lyons et al. (2000) use simple numerical examples to show how
the FTRs work in a two-node case network model and give a gentle introduction of various
aspects of FTRs such as property rights and transmission expansion, price hedging, and
allocation of FTRs. Also the authors conduct a market-wise study and show how various
FTRs are handled in PJM, New York and California markets. Their results are summarized
and extended in Table 2. Finally, the authors stress that although there is no universally
superior model for FTRs, they are still very useful tools in electricity markets with locational
pricing.
In another survey study, Kristiansen (2003) investigates how FTRs are acquired and
implemented in a range of markets such as PJM, New York, New England, California,
9Texas, and New Zealand. In each market, the author describe in detail the features of
FTRs, some design issues, strength and weakness, and the market performances in diﬀerent
FTR markets. His result along with Lynos et al.(2000) is summarized in Table 2.
Denton and Waterworth (2002) did a comprehensive practical study about how FTRs
could be introduced in Australian National Electricity Market (NEM)2. The Settlements
Residue Auction (SRA) was established shortly after NEM to help market participants
manage risks. The authors start their report by stating the rationale for changing the
SRA process to create a better environment for implementing FTRs. They compare the
FTRs in the U.S. markets such as PJM and New England. Then they introduce a workable
FTR solution in line with the modiﬁed SRA and discuss how the proposed FTR solution
addresses the critical issues in the Australian electricity market.
2.3 The Illustrative Two-stage FTR Study
Although the current literature expresses a mixed feeling about FTRs, it is not unfair to say
more negative views are held toward FTRs (Joskow and Tirole 2000, Oren 1997, Bushnell
1999, Siddiqui et al. 2003, Deng et al. 2004, etc). While FTRs are widely adopted as a
ﬁnancial hedging instrument to help market participants to reduce their risks in the major
U.S. wholesale power market, it seems not working very well. Why? Is it because of the
complicated wholesale power market structure, or because the market participants are still
learning how to place the bids and oﬀers more eﬃciently, or because there is something
fundamentally wrong about it?
Some close examination of previous work might give us some clues. For example, in
the inﬂuential paper by Joskow and Tirole (2000), we found that although the authors
demonstrated that introducing FTRs can decrease the overall eﬃciency, enhance the market
power and reduce the welfare, their model seems to be too restrictive in the sense that there
is no uncertainty involved. Since FTR, by construction, is used as a ﬁnancial instrument to
hedge against uncertain proﬁt, if there is no uncertainty, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that FTR at most won’t do any good and may in general do worse than the case
where there are no FTRs available. In fact, Joskow and Tirole’s welfare comparison shows
that the social welfare under the absence of FTRs is as high as and in general strictly higher
than that with FTRs in the case of no uncertainty.
In this paper, the goal is to illustrate how a simple two-stage FTR model can work to
2Although their report mainly focuses on the application in Australian national electricity market, there
are indeed many similarities between Australian market and major U.S. markets such as PJM, New York
and New England.
10Table 2: Comparison of FTRs in Major U.S. Wholesale Power Market (Source: Kristiansen
2003, Lyons et al. 2000, NEPOOL FTR manual 2003b, MISO FTR manual 2005)
PJM New York New England
Name Fixed Transmission Rights Transmission Congestion Contracts Financial Transmission Rights
Contract Obligations & options , Obligations, no hedge against Obligations, no hedge against
no hedge against losses losses losses
Duration Monthly auction, annual 6 months and 1, 2 and 5 year Monthly auction
network integration auction, monthly reconﬁguration
service FTRs
Acquisition Network integration service, Centralized TCC auction, Auction, secondary market,
ﬁrm point-to-point service, direct sales, and secondary transmission updates, entities
auction, secondary market market paying congestion charges
Auction Monthly, single-round, Seasonal (multi-round), Monthly, single-round,
design uniform-price auction monthly reconﬁguration uniform-price auction
uniform-price auction
Congestion Excess rents distributed to Excess rents oﬀset transmission Excess rents distributed to
rents deﬁciencies in other periods, system cost, deﬁcit rents covered FTR holders, deﬁcit rents
deﬁcient rents reduce by the transmission owners reduce payments
payments proportionally proportionally
Distribution FTR auction revenues are All revenues received by FTR auction revenues
of revenues allocated among the regional transmission owners from the sale are distributed to sellers
transmission owners in of TCCs and excess auction of FTRs and auction
proportion to their revenues, are credited against the revenue rights recipients
transmission revenue transmission owner’s cost of
requirements service to reduce the transmission
service charge
Website http://www.pjm.com/ http://www.nyiso.com/ http://www.iso-ne.com/
California Texas Midwest
Name Firm Transmission Rights Transmission Congestion Rights Financial Transmission Rights
Contract Option-like, no hedge Inter-zonal option Obligation, phase in option
against losses in the future
Duration Annual auction Monthly and annual auction 3 months or 1 year auction
Acquisition Auction, secondary market, Auction, secondary market Auction, secondary market,
hour-ahead market allocated based on existing
transmission rights
Auction Annual, multi-round Annual, monthly, single-round, Annual, seasonal(3 months),
design uniform-price auction 24 simultaneous combinatorial monthly auction
auction
Congestion Excess rents partly cover Any rent shortfall is uplifted Excess rents redistributed
rents the ﬁxed costs of the grid to load and any surplus is to FTR holders
deﬁcient rents reduce credited against other uplift
payments proportionally to load
Distribution The auction proceeds go Credited to load entities in To be determined
of revenues to the participating proportion to their load
transmission owners. Each ratio share
of them credits its FTR
auction proceeds against
its access charge
Website http://www.caiso.com/ http://www.ercot.com/ http://www.midwestiso.org/
11improve social welfare should there is any uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, we would like to address
the following fundamental question: when we introduce uncertainty, does FTR matter now?
In addition we want to conduct a welfare comparison in the uncertainty case to see if intro-
ducing FTRs is able to improve the social welfare or not. We start in section three (Stage
1) by constructing a benchmark model, which focuses on a two-node electricity network
where there is one generator and one LSE in each node with parameterized marginal cost
and demand functions, supervised by an independent system operator (ISO). This is essen-
tially the competitive equilibrium (CE) case. By solving this benchmark model as the usual
CE case, we obtain a security-constrained economic dispatch solution. Section four (Stage
2) presents the FTR model with stochastic shocks. Using the results from the benchmark
model as building blocks, we then solve for the optimal FTR hedge solutions, and show
that once uncertainty (even in a very simple form) is introduced, the acquisitions of optimal
FTRs by the risk averse generators and LSEs increase and in general strictly increase the
social welfare compared with the case where there are no FTRs available. This result thus
serves as an counterexample to the somehow negative views of FTRs by other economists
in the literature and provides some economic explanations to the fact that FTRs are widely
adopted as a ﬁnancial hedge instrument in the major U.S. wholesale power markets.
3 The No-rights Benchmark Model
The benchmark model consists of a simple two-node electricity network connected by a
transmission line with a thermal limit. There is only one good in this model: electricity
power, which is supplied by a group of unregulated generating companies (generators for
short), wholesale power suppliers, and demanded by a group of Load Serving Entities(LSEs),
wholesale power buyers. LSEs can be thought of as the distribution companies that can buy
the ”bundled” electricity power in the wholesale market and resell it to downstream end-
user consumers. There is also an Independent System Operator (ISO) that operates the
transmission network and manages the energy market. So there are three types of agents in
this model: generators, LSEs and ISO.
Furthermore, each LSE has a price-sensitive and downward sloping demand curve. Each
generator supplies the real power with a non-decreasing marginal cost. To obtain a dis-
patched quantity of power, all generators submit their supply oﬀers and all LSEs submit
their demand bids to ISO in the wholesale power market. ISO by its nature is a not-for-
proﬁt organization and behaves like a ”social planner” to maximize the total net beneﬁt of
generators and LSEs based on their submitted oﬀers and bids information by solving the
12optimal quantities of power supply and demand for each generator and LSE subject to the
physical network constraints 3.
3.1 Model Speciﬁcations and Assumptions
To make this benchmark model simple, we make the following speciﬁcations and assumptions:
• There are only 2 nodes, namely node 1 and node 2, in this electricity network, which
implies that power may either ﬂow from node 1 to node 2 or node 2 to node 1 through
the transmission line with the maximum power ﬂow equal to the thermal limit capacity
T (T > 0). Also assume there is no loss during power transmission.
• For simplicity, suppose there is only one generator at each node, i.e., G1 at node 1 and
G2 at node 2. Let QG1 and QG2 be the power supply quantities (injections) at node 1
and 2, respectively. The total cost function TCi(QGi), variable cost function V Ci(QGi),
and marginal cost function MCi(QGi) for generator Gi (i = 1,2) are speciﬁed as follows:




















































i ,fi) are all positive for i = 1,2.
• For simplicity, suppose there is only one LSE at each node, i.e., LSE1 at node 1 and
LSE2 at node 2. Let QL1 and QL2 be the power demand quantities (withdrawals) at
node 1 and 2, respectively. The demand function Dj(QLj) and gross consumer surplus






3This modelling framework is a simpliﬁed version of Standard Market Design(SMD) implemented by ISO




























j ) are all positive for j = 1,2. After purchasing QLj amount
of power in the wholesale market, each LSEj can then sell the QLj amount of power
to its local downstream consumers and receive resale revenue equal to Rj
4
• There are no learning and bidding strategies for either generators or LSEs. Each gener-
ator bids his true marginal cost function and each LSE bids his true demand function.
The information set consisting of each generator’s TC,V C,MC, each LSE’s GCS and




i ,fi;T) > 0 for
i,j = 1,2 is known to public. Moreover, the structure parameter vector is ﬁxed and
given in the model. So there is no uncertainty and no private information in this model.
• After collecting the information through generators’ supply oﬀers and LSEs’ demand
bids, ISO solves a Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED)5 problem by max-
imizing the total net beneﬁt subject to a set of physical power network constraints
in the day-ahead power market6 to solve for the optimal dispatch quantities for all
generators and LSEs and derive the associated locational marginal prices7(LMPs) for
each node. Consequently, each generator produces QGi amount of power at the ISO’s
dispatch and is paid by ISO the LMP per unit of its produced power for i = 1,2, while
each LSE purchases QLj amount of power at the ISO’s dispatch and pays ISO the
LMP per unit of purchased power for j = 1,2. Recall that since there is a transmission
line connecting the two nodes, the total power produced at a local node does not have
4The downstream resale revenue for LSEj could be speciﬁed as Rj(QLj) = (βj −αjQLj)QLj for j = 1,2,
where βj and αj are the parameters of aggregate demand function in the resale market at node 1 (j = 1)
and node 2 (j = 2).
5See the following section for a discussion of this SCED problem formulation.
6According to ISO New England Standard Market Design (SMD), the real U.S. wholesale power market is
a complicated two-settlement system which consists of consists of several submarkets including Day-Ahead,
Real-Time, Supply Re-oﬀers, FTR, and bilateral markets to reduce uncertainty for market participants and
ensure orderly, fair, and eﬃcient market outcomes. For simplicity, assume the dispatched quantities of powers
committed in the Day-Ahead market are exactly carried out in the Real-Time market (Real-Time market
is just a duplicate of Day-Ahead market and thus negligible), all generators submit their true marginal cost
(so no Supply Re-oﬀer market is needed), and assume bilateral trades are prohibited. Thus in this paper
only the Day-Ahead (in this section) and FTR (in the next section) (sub)markets are considered.
7Roughly stated, location marginal price at any given node is the minimum incremental cost of providing
one additional unit of power at that node.
14to match up with its local demand. For example, some low-cost generator may pro-
duce more than its local demand and transfer the ”overproduced” power through the
transmission line to fulﬁll the residual demand at a high-cost generator node. How-
ever the power ﬂow through the transmission line has an upper limit equal to the line
thermal capacity T. When the power ﬂow reaches that upper limit T, we call the
line is congested. One important consequence of congestion is that the LMPs will no
long be the same across all nodes. Assuming no loss during power transmission, the
separation of LMPs creates the congestion rent(CR) (diﬀerence between LMP1 and
LMP2 multiplied by T), which is accrued to ISO.
• To further simplify the model, assume the minimum production capacities for G1 and
G2 are both zero implying that it is feasible for generators to stop producing power
while bearing the ﬁxed cost. And assume the maximum production capacities for
G1 and G2 are both inﬁnitely large so that the generators can meet arbitrarily high
demands in the power market. Therefore the locational marginal prices for node 1
and 2, LMP1 and LMP2, are the last unit marginal cost for Generator 1 and 2 or the
marginal unit of willingness to pay for LSE 1 and LSE 2 when the thermal constraint
T is binding; LMP1 and LMP2 become the same and are equal to the market clearing
price of the aggregate demand and supply functions when the thermal constraint is
not binding.
• The benchmark model can best summarized in Figure 2.
3.2 Model Setup
Based on the above assumptions and speciﬁcations, this benchmark model boils down to a
Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) problem 8. As detailed in Stoft (2002),
dispatch is the process of determining generator output level for the servicing of LSEs. Eco-
nomic Dispatch means that the dispatch process is eﬃcient. Security-Constrained Economic
Dispatch (SCED) means that constraints are imposed in the economic dispatch problem
to ensure that the power on each node of the transmission line is within the balancing,
non-negative and thermal limits.
The objective of this SCED problem is then to maximize the ’total net beneﬁt’ (TNB)
subject to the balancing, non-negativity, and thermal limit constraints. The balancing con-
straint should be respected because it represents the physical aspect of the electricity net-
work, which is essentially stated in the Kirchhoﬀ’s law: total power injections should be
8SCDE is essentially a constrained optimization problem.
15Figure 2: The two-node electricity benchmark model.
equal to total power withdrawals at any time in the electric network. In our benchmark
model, this requires that the power supplies by G1 and G2 should be equal to power de-
mands by LSE1 and LSE2. The non-negativity constraint holds naturally since we only
allow the real power production and purchasing in this model 9, and exclude the speculative
behaviors such as taking a short position in the day-ahead power market. Lastly the thermal
limit constraints have to be respected due to the physical aspect of the transmission line,
i.e., the power ﬂow between two nodes simply cannot exceed the thermal capacity limit of
the transmission line.
When the thermal constraint becomes binding, it might be necessary to supply a next
unit of power by dispatching the relatively expensive local generation out of merit order,
i.e., in place of the other generation with lower marginal cost. Locational marginal prices
(LMPs) reﬂect the cost of this out-of-merit-order dispatch. A separate LMP is calculated for
each pricing location (node). Technically, the LMP at any node k is deﬁned to be the change
in total system variable costs that would result if one more unit of power were to be serviced
at node k. In our simple benchmark model, LMPk then reduces to the marginal cost of the
last unit of power for Gk at node k, for k = 1,2. In the absence of binding thermal limit
constraint, and assuming no transmission losses, each node has the same LMP. Otherwise,
however, price separation can occur, meaning that diﬀerent nodes can have diﬀerent LMPs.
9This is also the case in the real world wholesale power markets such as New England (ISO New England
(2004)).
16TNB is deﬁned as the sum of all LSE surpluses and all generator surpluses. In the
benchmark model, TNB is just the sum of surpluses from LSE1,LSE2,G1,G2. Geomet-
rically, TNB represents the summed area under the demand curve less the area under the





[D1(QL1) − MC1(QG1)]dQ +
  Q
0
[D2(QL2) − MC2(QG2)]dQ (11)
= [GCS1(QL1) − V C1(QG1)] + [GCS2(QL2) − V C2(QG2)] (12)
where






































with respect to QG1,QG2,QL1,QL2
subject to:
QG1 + QG2 = QL1 + QL2 (balancing constraint) (15)
QG1 ≥ 0, QG2 ≥ 0, QL1 ≥ 0, QL2 ≥ 0 (non-negativity constraint) (16)
−T ≤ QG1 − QL1 ≤ T (thermal constraint for node 1) (17)
−T ≤ QG2 − QL2 ≤ T (thermal constraint for node 2) (18)











which maximizes (11) or (12) subject to (15) - (18). Based on this solution we can then derive
LMP1 and LMP2
10. Note that the SCED solution vector s∗ is ISO’s dispatch quantities in
the day-ahead market, and LMP1 and LMP2 are the locational marginal price applied to
node 1 and node 2, respectively.
10By deﬁnition, the locational marginal price (LMP) at node k is the minimum incremental cost of produc-
ing one additional unit of power at node k. Recall in this benchmark model, we assume the zero minimum
production and inﬁnitely large maximum production capacity, the minimum incremental cost of producing
one more unit of power is just the marginal cost at that node. Furthermore, as we will show in the Appendix
1 and 2, LMP is indeed captured by the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the balancing constraint.
173.3 The SCED Solution
To present the solution to this SCED problem in a more orderly fashion, it is proposed in
this paper to solve the SCED problem in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, assume the thermal
limit T is so large that the thermal constraints will never get binding (thus the two thermal
constraints are ignored), which simpliﬁes the problem at hand to be a standard maximization
problem. Then use the solved optimal solution to check if the thermal limit constraints are
actually binding or not. If not binding, then we are done; if binding, then proceed to step
2. In step 2, resolve the SCED problem by adding one of the thermal limit constraint as the
equality constraint. The formal procedure of solving this model is presented as follows:
3.3.1 Step 1: Thermal constraint T is NOT binding
In this step, suppose the thermal limit T is so large that the thermal constraint will never
get binding. According to the model setup section, this is a standard optimization problem
with one equality constraint (the balancing constraint) and four inequality constraints (the
non-negativity constraints for QG1, QG2, QL1 and QL2). Use µ as the multiplier for equality







































+µ(QG1 + QG2 − QL1 − QL2) + λG1QG1 + λG2QG2 + λL1QL1 + λL2QL2 (19)
For simplicity, only consider the case where all dispatched quantities are positive, i.e., all
non-negativity constraints are not binding 11, we obtain the following non-thermal-constraint
solution (denoted with a hat). (The detailed derivation is provided in Appendix 1):
ˆ QG1 = (G1 + B1)/A (20)
ˆ QG2 = (G2 + B2)/A (21)
ˆ QL1 = (L1 + C1)/A (22)
ˆ QL2 = (L2 + C2)/A (23)
11To be exhaustive, we ﬁnd 9 other possible solution cases, i.e., (1) QG1 = 0; (2) QG2 = 0; (3) QL1 = 0;
(4) QL2 = 0; (5) QG1 = QL1 = 0; (6) QG1 = QL2 = 0; (7) QG2 = QL1 = 0; (8) QG2 = QL2 = 0; (9)
QG1 = QG2 = QL1 = QL2 = 0.
18where
G1 = D2B1 + aD
1 aS
2B2, B1 = aD
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2, D2 = aD
2 aS
2.
Now we solved the non-thermal-constraint SCED problem and need to examine the so-
lution ( ˆ QG1, ˆ QG2, ˆ QL1, ˆ QL2) closely to determine whether the thermal limit constraints are
actually binding or not. Before proceeding further, we formally deﬁne the term thermal
constraint is not binding, binding from 1 to 2 and binding from 2 to 1 as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 In this two-node electricity network model, after solving the non-thermal-
constraint SCED problem and obtaining the solution vector ( ˆ QG1, ˆ QG2, ˆ QL1, ˆ QL2), regarding
the thermal limit T, we say,
• T is binding from 1 to 2 if ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1 > T or ˆ QG2 − ˆ QL2 < −T;
• T is binding from 2 to 1 if ˆ QG2 − ˆ QL2 > T or ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1 < −T.
• T is not binding if | ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1| ≤ T or | ˆ QG2 − ˆ QL2| ≤ T;
Remarks: this deﬁnition elaborates the relationship between the optimal SCED solution
and network physical condition. Recall in this step we assume the thermal constraint will not
be binding and proceed to solve the SCED problem, and its solution is the actual dispatched
quantity that each generator will produce and each LSE will purchase. If the SCED solution
requires what Generator 1 produces ( ˆ QG1) be greater than what LSE 1 purchases ( ˆ QL1), then
the power ﬂow will transport ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1 amount of power from node 1 to node 2 through
the transmission line to meet the residual demand, which is equal to ˆ QL2 − ˆ QG2
12, at node
2. However the power ﬂow is not allowed to exceed the upper limit of thermal capacity (T)
of the transmission line. So if that does happen, that is, ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1 > T or equivalently,
ˆ QL2 − ˆ QG2 > T, we call the thermal constraint is binding with power ﬂowing from node 1
to node 2, or use the deﬁnition, T is binding from 1 to 2. In this case, the non-thermal-
constraint SCED solution is not appropriate any more, and we will need to continue on to
Step 2.
12Note that the balancing constraint is observed here, i.e., extra production meets residual demand im-
plying ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1 = ˆ QL2 − ˆ QG2, which is equivalent to the balancing constraint ˆ QG1 + ˆ QG2 = ˆ QL1 + ˆ QL2
19If, on the other hand, the SCED solution requires what Generator 2 produces ( ˆ QG2)
be greater than what LSE 2 purchases ( ˆ QL2), then the power ﬂow will transport ˆ QG2 −
ˆ QL2 amount of power from node 2 to node 1 through the transmission line to meet the
residual demand, which is equal to ˆ QL1 − ˆ QG1 at node 1. By the similar argument, the
thermal constraint is binding with power ﬂowing from node 2 to node 1, or use the deﬁnition,
T is binding from 2 to 1. In this case, the non-thermal-constraint SCED solution is not
appropriate any more, and we will need to continue on to Step 2.
If the power ﬂow in the above two cases indeed does not exceed thermal limit T, i.e.,
| ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1| ≤ T or | ˆ QG2 − ˆ QL2| ≤ T, we call T is not binding13. In this case, the non-
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By the nature of this problem, since the thermal constraint is not binding, each generator
and LSE are bidding their true marginal cost and demand functions, ISO acts as a ”social
planner” trying to maximize the total net beneﬁt taking into account of all generator’s
production cost and all LSE’s willingness to pay, there is no strategic behaviors and any
other system distortions. From the standard microeconomics point of view, this is both the
competitive equilibrium and Pareto optimal outcome and LMPs are the same across two
nodes as a result of aggregate market (node) clearing process 14.
13In this two-node benchmark model, there is small likelihood that the SCED solution requires what
Generator 1 produces happen to be the same as what LSE 1 purchases. Then by the balancing constraint,
this implies that what Generator 2 produces has to be the same as what LSE 2 purchases. So there is zero
power ﬂow between node 1 and node 2. This case certainly falls into the category of ”T is not binding”.
14It is worth mentioning that when thermal constraint is not binding, the SCED solution can also be
obtained through the market clearing point of the aggregate supply (marginal cost) and aggregate demand
curves, i.e., ﬁnding the aggregate market clearing price (the common LMP) and referring it back to the
individual demand and supply curves to obtain the SCED solution.
203.3.2 Step 2: Thermal constraint T is binding
Based on Step 1, if we know T is binding from 1 to 2, i.e., ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1 > T, we can set
QG1 − QL1 = T, the SCED problem does not change from Step 1 other than adding one
more constraint QG1 − QL1 = T. Denoting µ’s as the multipliers for equality constraints








































For simplicity, only consider the case where all dispatched quantities are positive, i.e.,





L2) (The detailed derivation is provided in Appendix 2):
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L2 = (B2 + a
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2T)/A2 (28)
LMP1 = (E1 + D1T)/A1 (29)
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Similarly, if, from Step 1, we know T is binding from 2 to 1, i.e., ˆ QG2 − ˆ QL2 > T,













G2 = (B2 + a
D
2 T)/A2 (32)
15To see the complete solutions, refer to Appendix 2.
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L2 = (B2 − a
S
2T)/A2 (34)
LMP1 = (E1 − D1T)/A1 (35)
LMP2 = (E2 + D2T)/A2 (36)
3.4 Solution Discussion
Based on the two-step SCED solution and the associated locational marginal prices LMP1
and LMP2, we can obtain the following propositions:
Proposition 1 In the two-node electricity network, when thermal constraint T is binding,
power ﬂows from node 1 to node 2 (or node 2 to node 1) if and only if LMP2 > LMP1 (or
LMP1 > LMP2)(assuming the dispatched quantities are all positive in the SCED solution).
Furthermore,
(∗1) T is binding from 1 to 2 ⇔ LMP2 > LMP1 ⇔ Ω > T (37)
(∗2) T is binding from 2 to 1 ⇔ LMP2 < LMP1 ⇔ Ω < −T (38)
(∗3) T is NOT binding ⇔ LMP2 = LMP1 ⇔ −T ≤ Ω ≤ T (39)
where
Ω = (A1E2 − A2E1)/(D1A2 + D2A1);
A1 = aD
1 + aS
1, D1 = aD
1 aS
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Proposition 1 has shown the relationship between the power ﬂow direction and magnitude of
LMPs under the condition that the thermal constraint is binding in the two-node electricity
network 16. Recall that if the thermal constraint is not binding, even if there is power
ﬂow, the LMPs will be the same across two nodes (see the Step 1 SCED solution). So this
proposition basically asserts that whenever the thermal constraint T is binding, the power
(which is equal to T) always ﬂows from low LMP node to high LMP node. This result can be
derived mathematically from the SCED solution and thermal constraint binding conditions
in this benchmark model. The detailed proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix 4.
16However, as the counter example in Kirschen and Strbac (2004) shows, the result in this proposition
does not generalized to the case where the number of nodes is greater than or equal to three due to the
externality brought by the ”loop ﬂow” eﬀect.
22The economic intuition behind this proposition is that the generator at the high LMP
node has a high marginal cost and the generator at the low LMP node has a low marginal
cost 17. So when ISO, acting as a TNB maximizer, dispatches the high cost generator to
produce less than its local demand and the low cost generator to produce more than its local
demand and transfer the excess supply (which is equal to T) over the transmission line to
meet the excess demand (which is equal to T) in the high LMP node, the power is indeed
ﬂowing from low LMP node to high LMP node. As we will see in the later section, this
proposition serves as the crucial foundation to derive FTR values,
Proposition 2 In the two-node electricity network, the SCED solution guarantees each gen-








Gk − fk , ∀ k = 1,2 (40)
and each LSE’s proﬁt has a function form as:
πLk = Rk(QLk) − LMPkQGk ∀ k = 1,2 (41)
Proof: As the SCED solution suggests, in the benchmark model, regardless whether thermal
constraint is binding or not, each generator submitting its true marginal cost function pro-
duces the dispatched quantity QGk and receives revenue equal to LMPkQGk while incurring




Gk. Also recall that LMPk is equal to the last unit
marginal cost of generator k for k = 1,2. The proﬁt function of generator k is:
πGk = LMPkQGk − TCk(QGk)
= (bS
k + aS








Gk − fk , ∀ k = 1,2
Similarly, each LSE submitting its true demand function gets the dispatched quantity QLk
and receives revenue equal to Rk(QLk) from downstream consumers while paying a total
amount of LMPkQLk for purchasing the power energy. The proﬁt function of LSE k is:
πLk = Rk(QLk) − LMPkQGk ∀ k = 1,2
This proposition shows that in the benchmark model, if generator Gk gets dispatched
it will produce QGk to cover its ﬁxed cost fk. Note that if a generator does not get any
17Recall LMP is deﬁned as the last unit marginal cost of the generator at the local node
23dispatch, then Gk must bear the negative proﬁt equal to its ﬁxed cost −fk. Similarly, if
LSEk gets demand dispatch it will purchase QLk to meet its downstream consumer demand
and acquires proﬁt equal to its resale revenue less its payment.
Proposition 3 In this two-node electricity model, the social welfare can be measured by total
net beneﬁt (TNB), and TNB increases as the thermal limit T increases, provided that the
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The proof is provided in Appendix 4. This proposition has a rich economic meaning
and important policy implications. It states that if the thermal limit of transmission line
T can be increased it will increase TNB 18 and thus lead to a more eﬃcient production
and a higher social welfare, provided that T is still binding. (Once the thermal constraint
T becomes non-binding, according to the SCED solution, we’ve already obtained the ﬁrst-
best outcome in the sense that it’s both competitive and Pareto optimal solution. Further
investment in the transmission line will thus be a waste of resources, provided that there
is no uncertainty.) However, expanding the capacity of transmission line (so as to increase
the thermal limit T) involves issues such as ’free ride’ due to its public good feature. So
how to create incentives for market participants to make transmission investment remains
an important and yet challenging concern to ISO.
To ﬁnish the benchmark model and proceed to the next section, we deﬁne a useful
deﬁnition of congestion rent.
Deﬁnition 2 In the two-node electricity network, when thermal constraint is binding, i.e,
the transmission line is congested, ISO acquires the congestion rent (CR) as its revenue,
18Recall that total net beneﬁt (TNB) consists of two components, consumer surplus (CS) and producer
surplus (PS). This proposition only shows that TNB increases when thermal limit T increases. It does not
indicate the individual eﬀect of CS and PS. As a matter of fact, in one of their examples, Kirschen and
Strbac (2004) shows that when the thermal limit T increases, in some circumstances, CS will decrease and
then increase while PS is monotonically increasing. So the policy implication is that to promote the idea of
transmission investment may improve the payoﬀs of generators at the cost of worsening the payoﬀ of LSEs
(for some range of thermal capacity T) although the total net eﬀect is Pareto improvement.
24which is equal to the diﬀerence in LMPs multiplied by T, that is,
CR = |LMP2 − LMP1|T (43)
Remarks: (a) When the thermal constraint T is binding from 1 to 2, i.e., T amount of
power ﬂowing from node 1 to node 2, the nature of the SCED problem must lead to ISO to
dispatch QG1 for G1, QL1 for LSE1 and QG2 for G2, QL2 for LSE2. At node 1, G1 receives
revenue LMP1 ∗ QG1 from ISO and LSE1 makes payment LMP1 ∗ QL1 to ISO. Since T is
binding from 1 to 2, QG1−QL1 = T. Therefore ISO has a revenue deﬁcit equal to −LMP1∗T.
Conversely, in node 2, G2 receives revenue LMP2∗QG2 from ISO and LSE2 makes payment
LMP2 ∗ QL2 to ISO. Since T is binding from 1 to 2, QL2 − QG2 = T. Therefore ISO has a
revenue surplus equal to LMP2 ∗ T. The ISO’s clearing process can be expressed as:
ISO’s revenue = −LMP1QG1 + LMP1QL1 − LMP2QG2 + LMP2QL2
= −LMP1T + LMP2T
= (LMP2 − LMP1)T
So the ISO’s revenue (congestion rent) is equal to (LMP2 − LMP1)T. This congestion rent
is positive since LMP2 > LMP1 when T is binding from 1 to 2 by Proposition 1.
(b) On the other hand, when the thermal constraint T is binding from 2 to 1, i.e., T
amounts of power ﬂowing from node 2 to node 1, by the similar argument, the congestion
rent that is accrued to ISO is equal to (LMP1 − LMP2)T. This congestion rent is positive
since LMP1 > LMP2 when Tis binding from 2 to 1 by Proposition 1.
Hence by (a) and (b) we conclude that when thermal constraint is binding the congestion
rent accrued to ISO is equal to |LMP2 − LMP1|T. This is a natural consequence of having
a binding thermal constraint. In other words, the fact that thermal constraint is binding
implies that the more expensive generation has been dispatched locally which could otherwise
be serviced by the less expensive generation had the thermal constraint were not binding.
Note that the congestion rent can be related to the tariﬀ issue in the international trade
literature with the diﬀerence that tariﬀ is imposed by government to purposely protect
domestic producers while congestion rent is the natural outcome of having a congested
transmission line. Just like in international trade, decreasing the tariﬀ would increase total
social welfare, decreasing the congestion rent, thus increasing thermal limit T, would also
enhance total net beneﬁt (TNB) in this two-node electricity network (see Proposition 3).
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T ∀i,j = 1,2) that are ﬁxed and known to public, there is no uncertainty and no private
information, which implies that the SCED solution derived from the benchmark model is
already the competitive equilibrium (ﬁrst-best) outcome. Therefore there is no incentive
for agents to purchase FTRs, and introducing FTRs can at best do no good to the model
economy. Indeed as Joskow and Tirole (2000) indicate in their model, the existence of FTRs
in the absence of uncertainty will only decrease social welfare compared with the case there
is no FTRs available. However, the benchmark model is very important because the SCED
solution and corresponding propositions serve as the building blocks to solve for the FTR
model in this section.
Since the absence of uncertainty dooms the fate of FTRs, we are now interested to see
whether introducing uncertainty into this model would create an incentive for agents to
purchase FTRs, and if yes, to what extent could FTRs possibly help enhance the social
welfare.
Based on the benchmark case, we will introduce a simple source of uncertainty into
the model: the parameter values that characterize the cost attributes of generators and
demand attributes of LSEs are now under stochastic shocks so that the direction of power
ﬂow and the magnitude of LMPs are no longer known in advance. This should create
an incentive for both generators and LSEs to hedge against their uncertain proﬁt streams
through purchasing FTRs. We will develop a formal model to investigate this hypothesis
and analyze the associated welfare eﬀects.
Recall that a ﬁnancial transmission right (FTR) is a ﬁnancial hedging instrument that
entitles the holder to receive compensation for transmission congestion costs that arise when a
transmission line is congested. The Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) proposed by
FERC (2003) recommends that transmission congestion be managed by the ISO through the
issuance of point-to-point (PTP) FTRs obligation in the day-ahead power market. Holders
of PTP FTR obligations would be charged or credited based on the congestion components
in day-ahead market LMPs.
Two issues here need to be clariﬁed before we proceed further on. First, recall that
there are four types of FTRs (PTP obligation, PTP option, FG 19 obligation, and FG
option) currently available in the U.S. wholesale power markets. For simplicity, this model
investigates only the ﬁrst one, namely, the PTP FTR obligation. Hereafter if not stated
19FG stands for ﬂowgate, which is mainly implemented by ERCOT in Texas and partly implemented by
CAISO in California.
26explicitly, FTR means PTP FTR obligation. The second issue is concerned with the time
horizon of the model. Recall that in this model, generators and LSEs can purchase FTRs to
hedge against their future proﬁt in the day-ahead power market. So the FTR market works
like a forward market (denoted with time t = 0), and day-ahead power market works like
a spot market 20 (denoted with time t = 1). Hence terms such as FTR forward market or
day-ahead spot market should not cause any confusions.
4.1 Model Speciﬁcations and Assumptions
• This model consists of two markets, one is FTR forward market and the other is day-
ahead power market. The basic day-ahead power market structure remains the same
as in the benchmark model, i.e., the two-node electricity network with one generator
and one LSE at each node and an ISO in the middle to manage the transmission
network and collect the congestion rent if the line is congested. All the cost and
demand function forms also remain the same as those in the benchmark model. Also
for simplicity, assume the dispatched quantities are all positive from the SCED problem
in the benchmark model.
• To make the case of FTR interesting, assume the thermal limit constraint T is so small
that it is always binding. The justiﬁcation is that if the thermal constraint is not
binding, there will be no price separation, i.e., LMP1 = LMP2, which directly implies
that the value of FTR based on the diﬀerence of LMPs becomes zero for sure regardless
whether is uncertainty or not. Therefore to preclude this trivial case, T is assumed to
be binding all the time.
• Introduce a stochastic shock to the two-node electricity network with a binding thermal
limit constraint T: in the FTR forward market (t=0) all agents know they will be in
one of the two states, state 1 or state 2, in the day-ahead power spot market (t=1)
such that if in state 1, T is binding from node 1 to node 2 with probability prob; if in
state 2, T is binding from node 2 to node 1 with probability 1 - prob. Then according
20The actual ﬂow of activities in the U.S. wholesale power markets shows that the FTR market is usually
operated once a month and the day-ahead market is operated once a day. In fact, day-ahead market is
operated one day ahead of real-time market. But since in this paper we have assumed that there is no
changes of power supplies and demands between day-ahead market and real-time market, day-ahead market
and real-time market collapse to be one market. See ISO New England (2004) for details.
27to Proposition 1, we have:
 
state 1: T is binding from 1 to 2 ⇔ LMP2 > LMP1 ⇔ Ω > T with prob;
state 2: T is binding from 2 to 1 ⇔ LMP2 < LMP1 ⇔ Ω < −T with 1 - prob.
To diﬀerentiate the notations in two states, denote the realized values of parameters
in state 1 with a ′ and state 2 with a ′′, that is, all the structure parameters except






















k with 1 - prob, ∀k = 1,2.
 
state 1: T is binding from 1 to 2 ⇔ LMP ′
2 > LMP ′
1 ⇔ Ω′ > T with prob;
state 2: T is binding from 2 to 1 ⇔ LMP ′′
2 < LMP ′′
1 ⇔ Ω′′ < −T with 1 - prob.
In reality, the shocks may come from various sources. For example, the changing
weather may suddenly increase/decrease LES’s demand attributes. Or the changing
price of raw material for producing electricity such as coal or oil may suddenly in-
crease/decrease generator’s cost attributes. Since these kinds of changes are really out
of control of any market participants, it may be reasonable to introduce these random
shocks into the model to create a simple form of uncertainty.
• Introduce two types of FTRs in this model, FTR12 and FTR21. (a) Deﬁne FTR12 as
the PTP FTR obligation that obligates the owner to get paid if thermal constraint T
is binding from 1 to 2 or get charged if thermal constraint T is binding from 2 to 1.
The total amount of payments or charges are equal to the number of FTR contracts
times LMP2 − LMP1. (b) Similarly, deﬁne FTR21 as the PTP FTR obligation that
obligates the owner to get paid if thermal constraint T is binding from 2 to 1 or get
charged if thermal constraint T is binding from 1 to 2. The total amount of payments
or charges are equal to the number of FTR contracts times LMP1 − LMP2.
• In this model, it is ISO who has the authority to issue these two types of FTRs at
pre-announced prices. Generators and LSEs can choose to buy these FTR contracts
28from ISO by paying the corresponding FTR prices and beneﬁt from its payoﬀs. On the
other hand, ISO receives the FTR sales revenue while paying for its associated payoﬀs
to generators or LSEs. Recall that ISO still receive some amount of congestion rent
(CR) (what diﬀers from the benchmark model is that now ISO does not know exactly
how much CR it will obtain in at time t = 0, but it can use the expected CR as an
approximation). So the ISO’s revenue adequacy condition is respected in expectation.
Lastly, ISO also gets to set the maximum amounts of FTRs for sale.
• Relying on the literature of corporate risk management, which argues that ﬁrms could
beneﬁt from hedging market risks (Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1990), Bessembinder
(1991), Froot et al. (1993)), it is argued in this study that ﬁrms (generators and LSEs)
in the electric power market are risk averse and are likely to beneﬁt from reducing
the risk of their proﬁts. Therefore, we assume generators and LSEs are risk averse
with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. Furthermore, to make
the calculation simpler, assume all generators and LSEs possess a logarithmic utility
function.
• Finally in this model, assume generators and LSEs can only buy FTRs (can take
long positions) but they cannot sell them (cannot take short positions), i.e., the FTR
secondary market is not available in this model. Furthermore, assume G1 and LSE2 can
only buy FTR12 and G2 and LSE1 can only buy FTR21. The reason is that since the
agents are all assumed to be risk averse, they will not be willing to purchase a ﬁnancial
instrument that will increase the risk of their proﬁts even higher. For example, if G1
can buy FTR21, it will only make its proﬁt stream more volatile, that is, when G1 buys
FTR21, if LMP1 > LMP2, FTR12 can bring LMP1 − LMP2 amount of per contract
proﬁt to G1, but G1 is already enjoying the high LMP1; similarly, if LMP1 < LMP2,
G1 will incur LMP1 − LMP2 amount of per contract loss for buying FTR21 , but G1
is already suﬀering the low LMP1. So purchasing the FTR12 will only make the G1’s
proﬁt even riskier. Similar arguments apply to G2, L1 and L2 too.
4.2 Model Setup
Generator’s and LSE’s total proﬁts come from two parts: proﬁt from power supply (or
demand) and proﬁt from purchasing FTRs.
Denote Gk’s proﬁt from power production as the random variable ˜ πGk. Then by Propo-




















k with 1 - prob, ∀k = 1,2.
(44)
Denote LSEk’s proﬁt from purchasing wholesale power from generator and reselling it to
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Lk are the Step 2 thermal-constraint-binding SCED solution (binding
from 1 to 2) in the benchmark model, and Q′′
Gk and Q′′
Lk are the Step 2 thermal-constraint-
binding SCED solution (binding from 2 to 1) in the benchmark model. Furthermore, to









that ˜ πGk > 0. This means in either state, the generator has a positive production proﬁt
thus does not go to bankrupt. For the similar reason, assume Rk(Q′




Lk) > LMP ′′
kQ′′
Lk so that ˜ πLk > 0.
Denote FTR12’s per contract payoﬀ function as the random variable ˜ H12. By the deﬁni-




12 = LMP ′













2 > 0 with prob;
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2 < 0 with 1 - prob.
(46)
Denote FTR21’s per contract payoﬀ function as the random variable ˜ H21. By the deﬁni-
tion of an FTR, we have ˜ H21 = − ˜ H12.
At this point, it may be of some interest to know the relationship between the FTR
payoﬀ spread and the thermal limit T. Deﬁne the FTR payoﬀ spread (FTRSP) as the net
diﬀerence in the realized FTR payoﬀs in two states (|H′ − H′′|). The following proposition
will show that the increasing thermal limit T will always decrease the FTR payoﬀ spread
FTRSP.
Proposition 4 Deﬁne the FTR payoﬀ spread as the net diﬀerence in the realized FTR












































































< 0 (since all parameters are positive)
Q.E.D.
Now let’s look at ISO’s revenue components. Similar to generators and LSEs, ISO’s total
revenue comes from two parts too: one part from collecting the congestion rent and the other
part from selling FTRs.
Denote the congestion rent that accrues to ISO as the random variable   CR. Then by
Deﬁnition 2, we have:
  CR =
 
CR′ = (LMP ′
2 − LMP ′
1)T with prob;
CR′′ = (LMP ′′
1 − LMP ′′
2 )T with 1 - prob.
(48)
So the total proﬁts for G1, G2, LSE1, and LSE2 and the total revenue for ISO can be
expressed as random variables ˜ ΠG1, ˜ ΠG2, ˜ ΠL1, ˜ ΠL2, and ˜ ΠISO, respectively, that is,
˜ ΠG1 = ˜ πG1 + ( ˜ H12 − η12)FTR12(G1) (49)
˜ ΠG2 = ˜ πG2 + ( ˜ H21 − η21)FTR21(G2) (50)
˜ ΠL1 = ˜ πL1 + ( ˜ H21 − η21)FTR21(L1) (51)
˜ ΠL2 = ˜ πL2 + ( ˜ H12 − η12)FTR12(L2) (52)
˜ ΠISO = ˜ CR + (η12 − ˜ H12)FTR12 + (η21 − ˜ H21)FTR21 (53)
where η12 and η21 are the ISO pre-announced prices of FTR12 and FTR21 at beginning
of FTR market, i.e, at time t = 0. To make the case interesting, assume H′
12 > η12 and
H′′
21 > η21, that is, ISO sets the FTR price below its positive payoﬀ so that generators and
31LSEs know that if they buy FTRs they are not losing money for sure. To see this, suppose
H′
12 < η12and take generator G1 for example. If G1 is in state 1, FTR’s total payoﬀ is
( ˜ H12 − η12)FTR12(G1) = (H′
12 − η12)FTR12(G1) < 0; if G1 is in state 2, FTR’s total payoﬀ is
( ˜ H12 − η12)FTR12(G1) = (H′′
12 − η12)FTR12(G1) = [(LMP ′′
2 − LMP ′′
1 ) − η12]FTR12(G1) < 0.
Since there is no private information, G1 knows for sure that he will lose money if he purchases
FTR12(G1). Similar argument applies to H′′
21 > η21. FTR12 and FTR21 are the maximum
amounts of FTR12 and FTR21 that are available to sell.
Recall in the benchmark model, the main problem is for ISO to maximize the TNB
subject to a set of constraints in the day-ahead spot market while generators and LSEs have
no control at all. In this model, however, the main problem is for generators and LSEs in
the FTR forward market to choose their optimal numbers of FTR contracts to hedge against
the proﬁt risks in the day-ahead spot market in order to maximize their expected utility of
proﬁt21. The total number of FTRs must satisfy ISO’s revenue adequacy constraint (RAC),
which in turn will ensure ISO passes the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) (see Hogan
(2002)).
Finally, to illustrate the point that FTRs really serve as hedging instruments in the sense
that FTRs can shrink the total proﬁt spread of agents in two states and thus risk averse
agents are willing to pay some amount of premium to buy FTRs, let’s look at the case for
G1.




















We see that with probability prob, G1 is in state 1 where LMP ′
1 is less than LMP ′
2 which
makes FTR12 bring positive proﬁt to G1, but G1 was suﬀering from receiving the low LMP ′
1
(relative to LMP ′
2), which directly decreases its production proﬁt π′
G1. Thus in this case,
the FTR compensates G1 for being in its unfavorable state by paying G1 a positive amount
of proﬁt.




















21After generators and LSEs make their FTR purchasing decision in the forward market, they wait until
the states get revealed. At that time they will be in the day-ahead spot market and everything follows the
results derived from benchmark model.
32We see that with probability 1 - prob, G1 is in state 2 where LMP ′′
2 is less than LMP ′′
1
which makes FTR12 bring negative proﬁt to G1, but G1 was enjoying in receiving the high
LMP ′′
1 (relative to LMP ′′
2 ), which directly increases its production proﬁt π′′
G1. Thus in this
case, the FTR penalizes G1 for being in its favorable state by taking away part of G1’s
production proﬁt.
So whether in state 1 or state 2, FTR12’s proﬁt stream will always be in the opposite
direction of G1’s production proﬁt to fulﬁll its hedging purpose. Similar argument applies to
G2, LSE1 and LSE2. Therefore, FTRs are indeed hedging instruments for generators and
LSEs to reduce their systematic proﬁt risks.
4.3 FTR Solutions
Assume all generators and LSEs possess logarithmic utilities and maximize their expected
utility of total proﬁt 22 by choosing the optimal FTR contracts, i.e., optimal hedge positions
subject to the ISO’s revenue adequacy constraint (RAC). Then G1, G2, LSE1 and LSE2’s
problem can be expressed as follows:
G1 : Max E[U(˜ ΠG1)] = prob log(Π
′
G1) + (1 − prob)log(Π
′′
G1) w.r.t. FTR12(G1) (54)
G2 : Max E[U(˜ ΠG2)] = prob log(Π
′
G2) + (1 − prob)log(Π
′′
G2) w.r.t. FTR21(G2) (55)
LSE1 : Max E[U(˜ ΠL1)] = prob log(Π
′
L1) + (1 − prob)log(Π
′′
L1) w.r.t. FTR21(L1) (56)
LSE2 : Max E[U(˜ ΠL2)] = prob log(Π
′
L2) + (1 − prob)log(Π
′′
L2) w.r.t. FTR12(L2) (57)
subject to:
FTR12(G1) + FTR12(L2) ≤ FTR12
FTR21(G2) + FTR21(L1) ≤ FTR21
E(˜ ΠISO) = E( ˜ CR) + (η12 − E( ˜ H12))FTR12 + (η21 − E( ˜ H21))FTR21 ≥ 0 (RAC)











12 − η12)(η12 − H′′
12)
(58)
22Since the underlying parameters are not normally distributed, the expected utility is not linear in


































12 − η12)(η12 − H′′
12)
(61)
First we derive the following important proposition:
Proposition 5 In a two-node electricity network model facing the uncertain parameter
shocks, all risk averse agents, i.e., generators and LSEs (assuming log utilities), will hold a
positive amount of FTRs if and only if the shock probability satisﬁes the following regularity
condition (RC):



































L2 + (η12 − H′′
12)π′
L2
This proposition states that when there is a stochastic shock in this two-node electricity
network, the risk-averse generators and LSEs will hold a positive amount of FTRs to hedge
against the uncertain proﬁt in the energy spot market, provided that the shock probability
satisﬁes the regularity condition.
Proof:
Recall that ˜ πGk > 0 and ˜ πLk > 0 implies π′
Gk > 0, π′′
Gk > 0, π′
Lk > 0 and π′′
Lk > 0, for k = 1,2.
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Therefore, to ensure that FTR∗
12(G1) > 0, FTR∗
21(G2) > 0, FTR∗
21(L1) > 0, and FTR∗
12(L2) >
0, we need to have prob > probG1, prob > probL2, prob < probG2, and prob < probL1, which
is equivalent to max{probG1,probL2} < prob < min{probG2,probL1}. Q.E.D.
Furthermore, when we investigate how the optimal FTR hedge positions change with the
change of shock probability prob, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 6 In a two-node electricity network model facing uncertain parameter shocks,
35the optimal FTR12 increases with increasing prob while the optimal FTR21 decreases with
increasing prob, provided that prob satisﬁes the regularity condition. The comparative statics













The economic intuition behind this proposition is straightforward. Recall that prob is the
probability that the transmission line is congested from node 1 to node 2. Increasing prob
thus implies that the transmission line is more likely to get congested from node 1 to node
2. Since congestion from node 1 to node 2 makes FTR12 bring positive proﬁt to its owner
but makes FTR21 bring negative proﬁt to its owner, the agents who own FTR12 (G1 and
L2) will tend to buy more of FTR12 while the agents who own FTR21 (G2 and L1) will tend
to buy less of FTR21. The formal proof is provided below.
Proof:
Recall that H′
12 − η12 > 0, H′′
12 − η12 < 0 and H′
21 − η21 < 0 H′′


























































21 − η21)(η21 − H
′′
21)] < 0; Q.E.D.
Now we are in a position to establish the most important proposition in this paper, that
is, to show that the existence of FTRs actually increases the social welfare in this two-node
electricity network model under stochastic parameter shocks.
Proposition 7 In a two-node electricity network model facing uncertain parameter shocks,
the acquisition of optimal FTRs by the risk averse generators and LSEs increases and in
general strictly increases the social welfare compared with the case where there is no FTRs.
Social welfare function W can be measured by generators and LSEs’ total expected utilities.
Denote the welfare under optimal FTRs as WF and the welfare without FTRs as W0. Then,
WF ≥ W0 (64)
The economic intuition behind this proposition is that since there is uncertainty in this
36model, generators and LSEs are not sure about their future proﬁts: they may enjoy high
proﬁts in one state or suﬀer low proﬁt in the other state. However they know ISO is issuing
a ﬁnancial instrument, namely FTR, which can be used to hedge against their risky proﬁt
by reducing the proﬁt spread between the two states. The risk averse generators and LSEs
are thus willing to pay some premium to buy FTRs in order to maximize their expected
utilities of future proﬁts. If all generators and LSEs maximize their expected utilities by
purchasing FTRs, then we can say FTRs increase the social welfare which is measured by
total expected utilities. The formal proof of the proposition is provided in Appendix 5.
This proposition has important economic implications. First, it shows that in this simple
two-node electricity network, once we introduce uncertainty (even in a very simple form),
the acquisition of FTRs by risk averse agents can increase total social welfare. Moreover, as
the proof shows, this result is strong and robust in the sense that regardless whether agents
take long or short positions 23, the social welfare with FTRs is higher and in general strictly
higher than that without FTRs. This result thus refutes the far more negative views of FTRs
by other economists such as Joskow and Tirole (2000), and provides an economic explanation
to the fact that FTRs are widely used in the major U.S. wholesale power markets.
Finally, in an attempt to endogenize the prices of FTRs, η12 and η21, consider an ISO’s
problem. Since all information is public, that is, ISO knows that generators and LSEs will
purchase FTRs to hedge against their risky proﬁt in the energy spot market. Then ISO can
solve generators and LSEs’ problems to get the optimal FTR hedge solutions and substitute
them into ISO’s revenue adequacy constraint (RAC):






























21 − η21)(η21 − H′
21)











E( ˜ H12) = probH
′











E( ˜ H21) = probH
′











23Even if taking short position of FTRs is not allowed in this model.
37Now ISO has several options to proceed. (a) The simplest option is to adjust η12 and
η21 so that the RAC becomes binding. Then the relationship between η12 and η21 can be
obtained as an implicit function denoted as g1() such that g1(η12,η21) = 0. (b) The more
complicated option that ISO can adopt is to adjust η12 and η21 so that it can extract a
maximum amount of residual congestion rent (RCR). Then ISO invests this RCR to expand
the transmission line, i.e., increase thermal limit T, which will reduce the uncertain proﬁt
spread, enhance eﬃciency, and increase social welfare. In this option, ISO can also get
another set of relationship between η12 and η21 in an implicit function denoted as g1() such
that g1(η12,η21) = 0.
To possibly obtain a unique solution for η12 and η21, we need to turn around and look
at the problem from generators and LSEs’ point of views. Since all generators and LSEs
are assumed to be risk averse, they must be willing to pay certain amount of premiums to
reduce the proﬁt risks. Then in equilibrium the risk premiums are equivalent to the price of
FTRs multiplied by the corresponding FTR contracts, that is, we have,
U[E(˜ πG1 + ˜ H12FTR12(G1)) − η12FTR12(G1)] = E[U(˜ πG1 + ˜ H12FTR12(G1))] (65)
U[E(˜ πG2 + ˜ H21FTR21(G2)) − η21FTR21(G2)] = E[U(˜ πG2 + ˜ H21FTR21(G2))] (66)
U[E(˜ πL1 + ˜ H21FTR21(L1)) − η21FTR21(L1)] = E[U(˜ πL1 + ˜ H21FTR21(L1))] (67)
U[E(˜ πL2 + ˜ H12FTR12(L2)) − η12FTR12(L2)] = E[U(˜ πL2 + ˜ H12FTR12(L2))] (68)










































































where E( ˜ H12) and E( ˜ H21) are as deﬁned as above and E(˜ π)’s are deﬁned as follows:
E(˜ πG1) = probπ
′
G1 + (1 − prob)π
′′
G1;
E(˜ πG2) = probπ
′
G2 + (1 − prob)π
′′
G2;
38E(˜ πL1) = probπ
′
L1 + (1 − prob)π
′′
L1;
E(˜ πL2) = probπ
′
L2 + (1 − prob)π
′′
L2.
After substituting the FTR∗∗ solutions into the ISO’s RAC and let ISO adjust η12 and
η21. Regardless whether ISO chooses option(a) or option(b), we can, in principle, derive
another relationship between η12and η21 in an implicit function denoted as g2() such that
g2(η12,η21) = 0.














5 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we’ve studied the competitive behaviors of electricity generators and LSEs,
and analyzed welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial transmission rights (FTRs) in a restructured U.S.
wholesale power market model. The analysis focuses on a competitive two-node electricity
network model where there is one generator and one LSE in each node with parameterized
marginal cost and demand function, supervised by an independent system operator (ISO).
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, a no-rights benchmark model is developed to solve for the
optimal quantity of power production and consumption (the SCED solutions) and derive
the locational marginal prices for each node, which serve as the building blocks to solve
for the optimal FTR hedge positions in the second model. Then in the second model, we
introduce a stochastic parameter shock into the two-node electricity network model, and
manage to show that in the absence of market power the acquisition of optimal FTRs by the
risk averse generators and LSEs increases and in general strictly increases the social welfare
compared with the case where there is no FTRs available. This result refutes the somehow
negative views of FTRs by other economists in the literature and provides the economic
explanations to the fact that FTRs are widely adopted as a ﬁnancial hedge instrument in
the major U.S. wholesale power markets.
This study can be extended in several ways. First, we can extend the model to have
an arbitrary number of generators and LSEs in each node. Admittedly, this extension adds
39the burden of calculations, but it does not change the essence of the solution. Mainly what
we should be concerned about is to obtain an aggregate marginal cost (supply) function
ASk(Gk) and an aggregate demand function ADk(Lk) for each node k = 1,2. Then proceed
to solve the model as if there were one ’representative’ generator and one ’representative’
LSE. After the aggregate solution is acquired, the solution quantities can be referred back
through LMPs to get the individual dispatched quantities. Although the process of solving
the problem is more tedious, the essence of the solution algorithm in this paper remains.
We expect that including multiple generators and LSEs at each node will not have dramatic
eﬀects on the solution outcomes.
Second, we can extend our two-node electricity network model to three nodes or more.
Then we will be introducing an important feature of real world electricity network, the ”loop
ﬂow eﬀect”, which considerably increases the modeling complications. Basically, the ”loop
ﬂow eﬀect” is associated with the fact that electrons follow the path of least resistance.
In an electric network with a transmission grid consisting of multiple connection lines, the
patterns of electricity ﬂows follow the famous Kirchhoﬀ’s laws in physics. For example, in
a three-node network, if there is a power injection Q at one node, say node 1 and an equal
amount of withdrawal at another node, say node 2, then depending on the reactance of line
1-2, line 1-3 and line 2-3, a proportion amount of power, say αQ ﬂows from node 1 to node
2 while the rest (1 − α)Q ﬂows from node 1 to node 3 then to node 2. For instance, if the
line reactance is the same for all three lines, then α = 2/3. In this case, we need to add one
more variable, the phase angle (φ), in order to control the power ﬂows between transmission
lines 24. Although there is signiﬁcant amount of work involved when we model the three-node
case, the result is expected to be closer to reality than the two-node case.
Third, in our two-node model, we assume generators and LSEs always submit their true
marginal cost and true demand function to ISO, so we always get the competitive solution
which is also Pareto optimal 25. But what if we relax this assumption so that generators and
LSEs can strategically submit their marginal cost and demand functions in the hope that
they can gain individual advantages through strategic behaviors.
Fourth, how about extending the static two-node model into a dynamic model with
multiple periods, where in each period, generators and LSEs submit their strategic bids and
oﬀers in a double auction framework in both FTR and day-ahead power markets. They
could be endowed with an initial wealth, and if they don’t make enough proﬁts within
several periods, then they are forced to bankrupt. Moreover, these generators and LSEs can
24Technically, we need to model the 3-node case using a Direct Current (DC) power ﬂow formulation.
25In the 3-node case, it becomes unclear that the outcome will still be Pareto optimal because of externality
brought by ”loop ﬂow” eﬀect.
40’learn’ what is the best strategies for them over time. The learning methods may include
reinforcement learning and anticipatory learning, etc.
With these complicated extensions, it seems almost impossible to proceed with analyt-
ical tools. A natural candidate that may ﬁt very well for this purpose is the agent-based
computational approach. For a comprehensive introduction of Agent-based Computational
Economics (ACE), see the ACE survey by Tesfatsion (2003). The next stage of this study is
to extend the static and competitive two-node electricity model into a dynamic multi-node
electricity model with learning agents bidding through double auction markets in a sequel
paper using agent-based computational approach.
41Appendix 1
The non-thermal-constraint SCED solution in Step 1 is derived as follows:
In step 1, when the thermal limit T never binds, the SCED problem is to maximize
the ’total net beneﬁt’(TNB) subject to the balancing and non-negativity constraints. This is
just a standard optimization problem with one equality constraint (the balancing constraint)
and four inequality constraints (the non-negativity constraints for QG1, QG2, QL1 and QL2).
Using µ’s as the multipliers for equality constraint and λ’s as the multipliers for inequality






































+µ(QG1 + QG2 − QL1 − QL2) + λG1QG1 + λG2QG2 + λL1QL1 + λL2QL2




























2QG2 + µ + λG2 = 0
∂L
∂µ
= QG1 + QG2 − QL1 − QL2 = 0
QG1 ≥ 0, λG1 ≥ 0, λG1QG1 = 0
QG2 ≥ 0, λG2 ≥ 0, λG2QG2 = 0
QL1 ≥ 0, λL1 ≥ 0, λL1QL1 = 0
QL2 ≥ 0, λL2 ≥ 0, λL2QL2 = 0
For simplicity, only consider the case where all dispatched quantities are positive, i.e.,
all non-negativity constraints are not binding (λG1 = λG2 = λL1 = λL2 = 0)26. Thus from
26To be exhaustive, we ﬁnd 9 other possible solution cases, i.e., (1) QG1 = 0; (2) QG2 = 0; (3) QL1 = 0;
(4) QL2 = 0; (5) QG1 = QL1 = 0; (6) QG1 = QL2 = 0; (7) QG2 = QL1 = 0; (8) QG2 = QL2 = 0; (9)
QG1 = QG2 = QL1 = QL2 = 0.
42FOCs we have:

      
      
aS
1QG1 + aD










2 QL2 = bD
2 − bS
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Notice the last equation shows that the Lagrangian multiplier associated with balancing
constraint is equal to the marginal cost, which by the nature of this SCED problem is also





































































































































which can be expressed as:
ˆ QG1 = (G1 + B1)/A
ˆ QG2 = (G2 + B2)/A
ˆ QL1 = (L1 + C1)/A
ˆ QL2 = (L2 + C2)/A






G1 = D2B1 + aD
1 aS
2B2, B1 = aD
1 A2C1, L1 = (D2 + aS
1A2)B1 − aS
1aS
2B2, C1 = aS
1A2C2;
G2 = D1B2 + aS
1aD
2 B1, B2 = aD
2 A1C2, L2 = (D1 + aS
2A1)B2 − aS
1aS
2B1, C2 = aS
2A1C1;
A = D1A2 + D2A1;
43A1 = aD
1 + aS
1, B1 = bD
1 − bS
1, C1 = bS
2 − bS





2, B2 = bD
2 − bS
2, C2 = bS
1 − bS




The binding-thermal-constraint SCED solution in Step 2 is derived as follows:
(a) Based on Step 1 non-thermal-constraint SCED solution, if we know T is binding from
1 to 2, i.e., ˆ QG1 − ˆ QL1 > T or ˆ QL2 − ˆ QG2 > T. We can set either QG1 − QL1 = T or
QL2 −QG2 = T. But one of them is redundant due to the fact that the balancing constraint
(QG1 +QG2 = QL1 +QL2) always holds in this two-node electricity network. So without loss
of generality, let QG1 − QL1 = T.
This is a standard optimization problem subject to two equality constraints (balancing
and thermal constraint) and four inequality constraints (the non-negativity constraints for
QG1, QG2, QL1 and QL2). Using µ’s as the multipliers for equality constraints and λ’s as the






































+µB(QG1 +QG2 −QL1 −QL2)+µT(T −QG1 +QL1)+λG1QG1 +λG2QG2 +λL1QL1 +λL2QL2
Recall all the parameters are positive, i.e., T > 0, aD
j > 0,bD
j > 0,, and aS
i > 0,bS
i > 0




























2QG2 + µB + λG2 = 0
∂L
∂µB
= QG1 + QG2 − QL1 − QL2 = 0
∂L
∂µT
= T − QG1 + QL1 = 0
QG1 ≥ 0, λG1 ≥ 0, λG1QG1 = 0
44QG2 ≥ 0, λG2 ≥ 0, λG2QG2 = 0
QL1 ≥ 0, λL1 ≥ 0, λL1QL1 = 0
QL2 ≥ 0, λL2 ≥ 0, λL2QL2 = 0
Rearranging the FOCs w.r.t QL1 and QG1, the FOCs w.r.t QL2 and QG2, and the FOCs
w.r.t µB and µT, we have:

    
    
aS
1QG1 + aD
1 QL1 = bD
1 − bS
1 + λL1 + λG1 ;
aS
2QG2 + aD
2 QL2 = bD
2 − bS
2 + λL2 + λG2 ;
QG1 − QL1 = T ;
QL2 − QG2 = T .

































Now to tackle the corner solution, ﬁrst let the solutions be all positive, i.e., QG1 >






































i ,T, for i,j =
1,2) must satisfy the following conditions (in other words, any violations to the following




























2T > 0 or QL2 > 0
Close examination on the above conditions indicates that Condition (*1) and (*4) will
not be violated here because in this case the thermal constraint is binding from node 1 to
node 2, i.e., node 1 as the net export node (NEN) and node 2 as the net import node (NIN).
Recall in the simplifying assumptions we assume that there is only one generator and one
LSE in each node. So node 1 as the NEN and node 2 as the NIN would imply that G1 has
to supply a positive amount of power over the transmission line and LSE2 has to demand a
positive amount of power sent from G1 in this two-node electricity network. Hence the total
power supply by G1, QG1, and the total power demand by LSE2, QL2, must be greater than
zero, which in turn proves that (*1) and (*4) will always hold in this case.
Then the Complementary Slackness Conditions (CSCs) for QG1 and QL2 will give us
λG1 = 0 and λL2 = 0.

































Since Condition (*1) and (*4) will always hold, we only need to examine Condition (*2)
and (*3) to get the SCED solutions. There are four cases to consider, i.e., [i] both (*2) and
(*3) hold; [ii] (*2) holds while (*3) is violated; [iii] (*3) holds while (*2) is violated; [iv] both
(*2) and (*3) are violated.
Case I: Both (*2) and (*3) hold (interior solution)
46When (*2) and (*3) hold, i.e., QG2 > 0 and QL1 > 0, the CSCs for QG2 and QL1 will give
us: λG2 = 0 and λL1 = 0.















































































Case II: (*2) holds while (*3) is violated
When (*2) holds, i.e., QG2 > 0, then the CSC for QG2 will give us λG2 = 0. Then from the
general solution (GS2) and (GS4), we know that Q∗
G2 and Q∗
L2 are the same as in Case I.
When (*3) is violated, i.e., QL1 < 0, then by the non-negativity constraint for QL1 we have
Q∗














and substituting it into (GS1), we have Q∗
G1 = T















































Case III: (*3) holds while (*2) is violated
When (*3) holds, i.e., QL1 > 0, then the CSC for QL1 will give us λL1 = 0. Then from the
general solution (GS1) and (GS3), we know that Q∗
G1 and Q∗
L1 are the same as in Case I.
When (*2) is violated, i.e., QG2 < 0, then by the non-negativity constraint for QG2
47we have Q∗














2 T and substituting it into (GS4), we have Q∗
L2 = T.















































Case IV: Both (*2) and (*3) are violated
When (*2) is violated, i.e., QG2 < 0, then by the non-negativity constraint for QG2 we have
Q∗
G2 = 0. QL2 is the same as in Case III, i.e., Q∗
L2 = T. When (*3) is violated, i.e., QL1 < 0,
then by the non-negativity constraint for QL1 we have Q∗
L1 = 0. QG1 is the same as in Case
II, i.e., Q∗
G1 = T

























So the Step 2 SCED solutions can be summarized as follows:
Step 2 SCED Solution (T is binding from 1 to 2)


























































A2 LMP2 = bD
2 − aD






1, B1 = bD
1 − bS
1, D1 = aD
1 aS







2, B2 = bD
2 − bS
2, D2 = aD
2 aS





(b) If, on the other hand, we know T is binding from 2 to 1 based on Step 1 non-thermal-
constraint SCED solution, i.e., ˆ QG2 − ˆ QL2 > T or ˆ QL1 − ˆ QG1 > T. We can set either
QG2 − QL2 = T or QL1 − QG1 = T. But one of them is redundant due to the fact that
the balancing constraint (QG1 +QG2 = QL1 +QL2) always holds in this two-node electricity
network. So without loss of generality, let QG2 − QL2 = T.
Using the same procedure as in (a), we can derive another set of Step 2 SCED solutions:
Step 3 SCED Solution (T is binding from 2 to 1)

















































A1 LMP1 = bD
1 − aD













Proof of Proposition 1:
First we want to show LMP2 > LMP1 ⇔ Ω = (A1E2 − A2E1)/(D1A2 + D2A1) > T.
Recall in Step 2 SCED solution, we know LMP1 =
E1+D1T
A1 and LMP2 =
E2−D2T
A2 . Then














> T (since A1,A2,D1,D2 > 0)
Next, let B1 = bD
1 −bS
1, B2 = bD
2 −bS
2 and C = bS
2−bS
1 and we want to show T is binding from 1 to 2 ⇔
49A1E2−A2E1
D1A2+D2A1 > T. Recall in the Step 1 SCED solution and Deﬁnition 1,



































































⇔ Ω > T
Since we showed T is binding from 1 to 2 ⇔ Ω > T and LMP2 > LMP1 ⇔ Ω > T, we’ve
proved (*1) in Proposition 1. Similar procedures can easily be applied to prove (*2) and
(*3), and thus is omitted here. Q.E.D.
Appendix 4
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) T is binding from node 1 to node 2
Recall in the benchmark model total net beneﬁt (TNB) is deﬁned as the total net surplus
























































































































































































> T (since A1,A2,D1,D2 > 0)
From Proposition 1 we know that





















T > 0 ⇔ T is binding from 1 to 2;
(ii) T is binding from node 2 to node 1

















T > 0 ⇔ T is binding from 2 to 1.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 5
Proof of Proposition 7:
By a deﬁnition of social welfare, we have WF = E[U(˜ ΠG1)] + E[U(˜ ΠG2)] + E[U(˜ ΠL1)] +
E[U(˜ ΠL2)] and W0 = E[U(˜ πG1)] + E[U(˜ πG2)] + E[U(˜ πL1)] + E[U(˜ πL2)].
51We can prove WF −W0 = ∆G1+∆G2+∆L1+∆L2 ≥ 0 if we can show (i)–(iv) are satisﬁed.
(i) ∆G1 ≥ 0;
(ii) ∆G2 ≥ 0;
(iii) ∆L1 ≥ 0;
(iv) ∆L2 ≥ 0.
where
∆G1 = E[U(˜ ΠG1)] − E[U(˜ πG1)];
∆G2 = E[U(˜ ΠG2)] − E[U(˜ πG2)];
∆L1 = E[U(˜ ΠL1)] − E[U(˜ πL1)];
∆L2 = E[U(˜ ΠL2)] − E[U(˜ πL2)].
We’ll prove (i)–(iv) one by one as follows:
Part (i), denote p ≡ prob, then,

































































































52Then in order to show ∆G1 ≥ 0, we need to show
p
p(1 − p)








For notation simplicity, let x ≡ XG1 > 0, and A ≡ pp(1−p)1−p > 0, and deﬁne a function
f( ) such that






Notice that when x = 1
p − 1, f(1
p − 1) = 1. So to prove f(x) ≥ 1 is equivalent to prove
the function f(x) is monotonically decreasing over the domain (0, 1
p − 1) and monotonically
increasing over the domain (1
p − 1,+∞). Rewrite f(x) as follows:




p−1 + A(1 + x)(p − 1)x
p−2
= Ax











< 0 if x < 1
p − 1;
> 0 if x > 1
p − 1;
= 0 if x = 1
p − 1.
That is, f(x) has a global minimum at x = 1




− 1) = 1
Hence, f(x) ≥ 1, ∀ x ∈ (0,∞), or f(p) ≥ 1, ∀ p ∈ (0,1). Notice if the regularity
condition is satisﬁed we have




















⇔ p ∈ (
1
1 + x
,1) ⊆ (0,1) (Recall p ≡ prob, x ≡ XG1)
So when the regularity condition is satisﬁed, i.e., G1 is taking long positions in the FTR
market, we certainly have f(p) > 1, which directly implies ∆G1 > 0. If, on the other hand,
the regularity condition is not satisﬁed, it can be easily shown that it corresponds to the case
53where p ∈ (0, 1
1+x) and G1 is taking short positions (although it is not allowed in this model)
in the FTR market, which also implies ∆G1 > 0. Finally, in the degenerate case where p
happens to be 1
1+x, then G1 takes zero position in the FTR market and ∆G1 = 0. Therefore
regardless whether G1 takes long, short or zero position in the FTR market, ∆G1 ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to verify that (ii), (iii) and (iv) are true using the exactly same
procedures as in (i). Since we have showed that (i)–(iv) are all satisﬁed, we’ve proved the
proposition result, WF ≥ W0. Q.E.D.
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